Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants
On August 7, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued its decision in Goce Gligorov v. Nation of Brunei addressing personal jurisdiction issues.
Gligorov, a Slovenian businessman, contracted with Bruneian government officials to investigate corruption within that government. Allegedly, after he provided evidence implicating high-level official involvement in theft, money laundering, and terrorism financing, his contractual partners reneged on the contract, and instead conspired, in conjunction with three corporate entities, to damage his reputation and business. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed his claims.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed dismissal for the lack of personal jurisdiction. It held that, in accordance with the parties’ agreement and considering Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires reasonableness and a meaningful nexus to the United States. Both possible legal bases for obtaining personal jurisdiction over corporate defendants have to match the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Firstly, the civil RICO statute’s service of process provision does not to establish jurisdiction over the corporate defendants because jurisdiction over Brunei itself cannot be established under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Secondly, Federal Rule of Procedure 4(k)(2) does not provide jurisdiction either. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate any concrete interest in litigation in the United States nor any meaningful U.S. interest in the dispute. In addition, the burden imposed by litigation in the District of Columbia on the three foreign corporate defendants cannot be unjustified.
The court also upheld the denial of jurisdictional discovery, concluding that there was an absence of a good-faith basis for the belief that further discovery would establish a sufficient U.S. nexus. -- By Eloise Henze, law student summer intern, Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP, Washington, DC.
Tue, / Embassy Law Link
FSIA Immunity and the Helms Burton Act
On June 23, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court released its major decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S. A. (Cuba) regarding the 1996 Helms Burton Act, which allows U.S. citizens and corporations to sue Cuban and international entities trafficking in Cuban land seized by the Cuban government during the 1960s Castro Regime. In 2019, oil company Exxon Mobil Corp. sued several Cuban corporations that operated and profited from land seized by the Castro regime in the 1960s, and that had been owned by Exxon before the seizure.
The Cuban companies are owed by the government and claimed immunity from such a suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, under which foreign states and entities, such as these corporations, are not subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts except under a few narrow exceptions. In this instance, lower courts sided with the Cuban companies, ruling that Exxon's suit did not fall under any exception to the FSIA, and that Exxon needed to demonstrate otherwise if the suit was to proceed. Exxon appealed, arguing that under the Helms Burton Act, FSIA claims are waived in instances like this.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court, finding in favor of Exxon, and ruled that because the Helms Burton Act, also known as the Libertad Act, was written explicitly to allow U.S. citizens and corporations to sue Cuban corporations, the HBA automatically carves out an exception to FSIA, and plaintiffs are not required to find another one. -- By John Capwell, Senior Legal Assistant, Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP.
Tue, / Embassy Law Link